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 Abstract 
 
 For years researchers have tried to determine if there is a relationship connecting 
a firm’s performance to a Chief Executive Officer’s compensation. The bulk of studies 
have been done in the United States and yielded results that indicated a numerically low, 
positive correlation between performance and remuneration.  
Using a sample of 168 Canadian publicly listed companies for the year 2003 and 
looking first at a wide array of industry sectors, this paper partially corroborates past 
research by finding a positive statistical relationships connecting salary to performance. It 
differentiates itself by finding a high sensitivity level connecting the CEO’s salary to a 
company’s performance. The results held true for different compensation structures and 
for four distinct measures of performance. Furthermore, to try to distinguish if the 
sensitivity levels between wage and company performance would change when focusing 
on specific markets, similar tests were applied to a subgroup composed of raw material, 
industrial product, and public service sectors. While the sensitivity levels between salary 
and performance were still positive, the coefficients for wage were smaller, which 
indicated less responsiveness on performance. In either case, it appears that theories 
regarding incentive contracts are working well to counter the agency problem and that 
CEO’s are in fact operating in the best interest of the shareholders.  
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1. Introduction 
 Is there a relationship between a Firms performance and a Chief Executive 
Officer’s compensation? This question has been in litigation for decades and has recently 
taken the spotlight with compensation steadily increasing in North America regardless of 
a firm’s poor financial results or condition.  
To understand this question, one has to recognize the source of the initial 
problem. Agency principal theory states that a problem exists when an agent (Chief 
Executive Officer) has established an agenda, which conflicts with the interests of the 
principal (Shareholder) (Attaway, 2000). This problem stems in part from the chief 
executive officers aversion to risk. This behavior induces him to reduce his “personal” 
risk by engaging in activities that lessen the firm’s risks; hence, his actions negatively 
affect the shareholders wealth.  
According to economists, the dominant approach in dealing with this problem is 
for the board of directors to design a compensation scheme that provides the executive 
with proper incentives to maximize the shareholders value. Holstrom (1979) has 
suggested that tying executive compensation to firm’s performance will motivate the 
executive to make more value-maximizing decisions for the stockholders. 
 For years, the pretense of linking pay to performance has given corporations 
justification for the size of the compensation packages granted to their CEO’s. “In 2000, 
John Roth of Nortel was awarded 135 million dollars including all the bonuses even 
though the company stock plummeted from a once high $124 to $10.”1 Due to such 
disparity, stockholders are convinced that no correlation exists between a company’s 
performance and the Chief Executive Officer’s salary. 
Past studies that grounded their research in agency theory have yielded consistent 
empirical evidence that have shown a positive statistically significant result, tying pay to 
performance but with a coefficient small in size, which indicates a marginal impact on 
wage (Murphy, 1985; Hall and Liebman (1998); Attaway, 2000). Studies traditionally 
addressed the problem by looking at compensation as a function of performance. The 
problem was modeled as a simple linear function, where the elasticity sensitivity between 
wage and performance was analyzed. 
                                                 
1 Nortel Network Proxy Circular, May 13, 2001, p.9-10 
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Most of the research done in this field was focused on the US market; therefore, it 
would be of great interest to carry out this Master Thesis research in the area of CEO 
compensation and firm performance, focusing on Canadian publicly traded companies on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). A better understanding of the type of relationship 
that exists between performance and compensation can bring additional insight to this 
problem. If there is no meaningful link between pay and performance, it is doubtful that 
the multi-billions of dollars of assets in public corporations are being managed 
efficiently. 
Using cross sectional data, this study will investigate the effect of CEO cash 
compensation (i.e., salary + bonus + other short term cash payments), and separately, 
total compensation (i.e., the sum of all form of salary, cash and long term incentive plans) 
with different performance measures (i.e., earning per share, return on equity, return on 
assets, and net profit margin), in a group of 168 Canadian companies listed on the TSE 
for the period of 2003. In addition, focusing on a specific industry subgroup composed of 
the raw material, industrial product and public service sector, this paper will test whether 
or not the sensitivity levels are greater or even statistically significant. 
 The research begins with section two giving an overview of key concepts 
discussed in this paper, section three will be a review of past research, section four will 
present the methodology, and section five will present the empirical results first for the 
sample as a whole and then for a subgroup of the sample. The research will conclude 
with a summary of its findings and suggestions for future research. 
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2- Principal-Agent theory 
Agency theory is at the core of any research trying to determine whether a 
correlation exists between performance and executives pay. The theory defines how to 
best categorize relationships in which one party (the principal defined as the Shareholder) 
determines the work, which another party (the agent defined as the Chief Executive 
Officer) undertakes (Eisenhardt, 1985). Amongst other concepts, the theory argues that 
under difficult monitoring conditions, such as imperfect information and uncertainty, an 
agency problem may arise in the form of moral hazard. 
 
2.1 Moral Hazard 
  Moral Hazard problems are common in labor contracting issues. It is the 
condition under which the principal cannot be sure if the agent has put forth his best 
effort. Moral Hazard problems can be present any time two parties come into a risk 
sharing agreement with one another, and where their privately taken actions affect the 
profitability of the total outcome. If this situation were to arise, optimal risk sharing is 
generally excluded since it will not yield the proper incentives for making the correct 
decision.  
Moral hazard problems can take the shape of compensation structure. Since the 
CEO’s compensation will be the same regardless of how much or how little the 
shareholder will benefit from his work, a fix salary might create a disincentive for taking 
value maximizing risks and putting forth his best effort. In order to resolve this situation, 
there needs to be a way to substitute some of the risk sharing where benefits of incentives 
can be achieved. The action, which is optimal for the agent, will depend on the extent of 
risk sharing between the principal and the agent (Holstrom, 1979.) 
 Incentive contracts can yield the proper stimuli for risk sharing. To entice the 
Chief Executive Officer to perform to the best of his ability, theory on moral hazard 
problem suggests replacing fixed wages with compensation that is tied to the profits of 
the company. The provision of ownership rights reduces the incentive for executive's 
moral hazard since it makes their compensation dependent on their performance (Jensen, 
1983).  
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2.2 Incentive Contracts 
An incentive contract is such that the remuneration is structured on the basis of 
the agent meeting specific “incentives” targets in the accomplishment of his contract. The 
purpose of the incentive contracts is to motivate the agents’ efforts and discourage the 
agents’ inefficiency and waste. A form of incentive contract is a fixed price contract. It is 
such that a normal profit is included in the contract and an additional award fee may be 
rendered for excellent performance.  
If a greater percentage of the executive compensation is equity based, it will 
entice the CEO to take more risk-neutral decisions, which are in the best interest of the 
principal. In the instance of the contract, the period of performance must be long enough 
to align the top managers interest with the interest of the principal. Incentive contracts 
usually encompass a base salary, annual cash incentives, equity-based incentives, and 
retirement plans. For the 168 companies being observed, 45% of their compensation 
packages are equity based. 
The base salary and annual cash incentive are short-term lump sums issued at the 
end of the financial year; the latter is dependent of performance criteria and may be paid 
in the following year. Equity based incentives are referred to as Long-term incentive 
plans (LTIP). They take the form of Stock option plan, restricted stock plan, phantom 
stock plan, deferred share units, and stock appreciation rights (SAR).  
The Stock Option Plan links compensation to shareholders’ interests because the 
value of the inducement is directly related to the company’s future stock price. This plans 
main objective is to give the option holder an interest in maximizing shareholder value 
over the long term. It enables the firm to attract and retain top managers with experience 
and ability while rewarding them for long-term performance. Stock option plan seems to 
be the preferred form of long-term incentive plans.2  
   
 
 
 
                                                 
2 62% of the companies analyzed awarded Stock options units as part of their LTIP. 
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2.3 Option Pricing Theory 
 Option pricing theory also called Black-Scholes theory, named after Nobel Prize 
winners Fisher Black and Myron Scholes, proposed that the cost of the option can be 
known in advance by dynamically hedging the short option while making assumptions on 
constant volatility and risk neutrality.3 The risk neutrality assumption is the basis of 
option-pricing theory and is central to all option-pricing models, including arbitrage 
pricing models (APT), and Monte Carlo method. 
Uncertainty defines dynamic hedging because different moves of the underlier are 
accompanied by multiple hedging strategies.4 Since there is a limit to the amount of time 
you can re-hedge, Black and Scholes took the case as the frequency approaches infinity, 
which at the limit created independence between the price path of the underlier and 
dynamic hedging. Since the price now depends on the volatility and assuming it is 
constant and known in advance, the cost of dynamic hedging a short option becomes 
certain. With certainty the option can be discounted at the risk free rate to obtain its 
option price. Since investors can hedge, options can be valued as if the investor was risk-
neutral and all assets are appreciated at the risk-free rate.  
Option’s awarded to executives are long term. Of the 168 companies observed 
during the course of this research, the average maturity of an option is 8.2 years as 
opposed to a conventional call option, which matures within 1 year. Merton’s (1973) 
option pricing formulas is a generalization of Black-Scholes model and it can be used to 
price a stock or stock index paying a known dividend yield.5 The yield is expressed in 
terms of an annually compounded rate and is assumed to be constant in this model. 
The problem that may arise when using stock options as the pivotal element in an 
incentive contract is that contrary to an outside investor who can hedge away the risk of 
his option (i.e., trade the option, or short sell it) a CEO cannot take any of these actions 
on his stock option. In addition, while outside investors can diversify their assets, 
                                                 
3 The original Black-Scholes (1973) formulas can be found in Appendix A 
4 An underlier is a security that is subject to delivery upon exercise of an option contract. 
5 Merton’s modified Black-Scholes formula that is used to calculate the value of  a European call option 
can be found in Appendix A. 
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company executives cannot diversify away some of their risk since a large portion of 
their assets (i.e., salary taking the form of stock options) is invested in their company. 
 
3 Past Literatures 
 Researchers in the past have established that there is a correlation between a top 
executive salary and a firm’s performance. While the strength of the relationship is 
usually numerically small, it is nonetheless positive and statistically significant. The 
literature defines performance as a determinant of compensation and looks at other 
possible factors that can affect the CEO’s wage. Countless articles focus on the United 
States due to the size of the market and the availability of data. A few of these articles 
were collected and summarized. 
 
3.1 Article Review 
 
(i) Kevin J. Murphy’s article, “Corporate performance and managerial remuneration, 
an empirical analysis”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, issue 7, 1985, analyzes the 
relationship between compensation and performance when accounting for different types 
of compensation package and performance indicator. 
Murphy uses panel data for 73 of the largest US manufacturing firms over the 
period of 1964-1981. The top executives in his sample have maintained their position as 
CEO for a minimum of five consecutive years. The model defines compensation as 
endogenous, and it is a function of performance.  
ititiiit ePerformbaComp ++=  
 
The empirical analysis focuses on six components of remuneration: Salary, 
Bonus, Salary & Bonus, Deferred Compensation, ex-ante value of stock options, and total 
compensation. Call options are valued using Merton’s modified Black-Scholes formula. 
Since shareholders are considered to be the principal in agency theory, corporate 
performance is not measured in terms of accounting profits, it is based on the rate of 
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return realized by shareholders ( tR ).
6 Murphy estimates that performance depends in part 
on past and current levels; hence, he creates a performance index to represent the 
cumulative stock market performance of each sample firm:  
( )ttt RSS += − 11   
 Murphy runs several sets of regressions by OLS. His first time series results of 
total compensation on performance yielded a pronounced positive effect. The estimated 
coefficients also suggest that the individual components of remuneration are sensitive to 
the shareholder’s realized rate of return. “A firm realizing a 10% return will increase the 
total remuneration paid to its executive by 2.1%.” Murphy attempted to compare his 
finding to past cross-sectional research by averaging the compensation and firm variables 
over time for each executive. The regression yielded a negative, statistically insignificant, 
coefficient for performance. “A firm realizing a 10% return will pay its executive 1.1% 
less than a firm with zero returns.” 
Since shareholder’s return is an imperfect proxy for managerial effort and the 
disparity between cross sectional data and time series was so pronounced, Murphy added 
the variable sales as an additional measure for performance. He re-ran two sets of 
regressions for both time-series and cross-sectional data, and he observed that in both 
cases the total compensation regression indicated a positive relationship between wage 
and performance. On average, a firm with a 10% return will increase total remuneration 
paid to executive by 1% in the case of cross sectional data and 1.6% using time series 
data. 
 His results indicate that there is a positive relationship between remuneration and 
firm’s performance that is statistically significant. In addition, this correlation appears 
slightly numerically stronger when using a time series process. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 1
1
−+=
−t
tt
t P
DPSP
R  , Where P and DPS are the closing stock price and dividends-per-share paid in 
fiscal year t, adjusted for stock dividends and splits.  
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(ii) Morris C. Attaway’s article, “A Study of the relationship between company 
performance and CEO compensation”, American Business Review, Jan 2000, tries to 
establish if the correlation between pay and performance is more significant when 
focusing on a specific industry sector (i.e., the computer and electronics industry). 
To determine the type of relationship that connects pay to performance, he uses 
panel data from 1992-1996 on 42 firms in the computer electronics sector. In order for 
firms to be included in his sample, all data had to be available for the period observed, 
the company had to be managed by the same CEO, and the executive had to be listed as 
one of corporate America’s most powerful people.  
Attaway uses a linear model, writing compensation as a function of return on 
equity (ROE), executive age, job tenure, stock ownership and education. Compensation is 
strictly based on salary and cash bonus because he considers it an acceptable substitute 
for more comprehensive measures (i.e., pension benefit, deferred pay, stock options, 
stock bonus, and profit sharing). Most of the variables used are self-explanatory except 
for education, which is grouped as no college, bachelor degree, masters degree, and 
above masters. For the performance measure, he chose ROE as the proxy variable. 
 The null hypothesis of his model: “There is a negative relationship or no 
relationship between pay and ROE”. The hypotheses were tested using Pearson Product 
Moment correlation and linear square regression analysis. The findings of his descriptive 
statistics are that all variables were statistically significant at 1% except for education, 
which meant that the null hypothesis was rejected. A 1% increase in performance would 
increase the executive’s wage by 0.005%. While the coefficient of ROE is positive and 
significant, the magnitude was found to be very small, which indicates very low 
sensitivity levels in the computer and electronics sector. 
 Being aware of the limitations of his research, Pearson suggests looking at a 
larger sample that will encompass both small and large firms, to include other 
comprehensive measures when defining wage, and to target other industry sectors to see 
if this phenomena is related to an industry effect. 
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(iii) Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman’s in the article, “Are CEO’s really paid like 
bureaucrats,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, August 1998, examines the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, by measuring how the 
value of a CEO stock and stock option changes when a firm’s stock market value 
changes. 
 They used a panel data set from 1980-1994 for CEO’s of the largest publicly 
traded American companies. Firms included in his study were listed at least once in 
Forbes 500 lists during the period analyzed. Although Hall and Liebman used relatively 
the same construct as Attaway (2000), they used them differently. They look at a linear 
relationship between compensation as a function of performance and CEO determinants. 
Compensation was defined as salary & bonus, stock option, restricted stock, other 
compensation, change in the value of stock holding and change in the value of stock 
option holding. The proxy for performance is taken as the stock price and stock return. 
The other exogenous variables are age, tenure, and stock ownership. Merton’s modified 
Black-Scholes formula was used in order to value stock option grants and holdings. 
 Since Hall and Liebman’s data contained detailed information on CEO stock and 
stock option holdings, it enabled them to calculate the change of a CEO’s wealth that is a 
direct product of a change in his respective firm’s market value.  
They use ordinary least square analysis to determine how sensitive executive 
compensation is to company performance. They break their analysis down into a few 
sections. First, they compare only salary and bonus to rate of return by running 
regressions with robust standard errors and find that although there is a positive 
relationship-tying wage to performance, the magnitude is relatively small. Second, the 
stock options and stock holding information is regressed with stock price. Changes in 
CEO wealth are now highly responsive to firms’ performance. “A $1000 increase in firm 
value increases CEO wealth by about $25 at the mean and $5.29 at the median.” These 
results corroborate the research of Murphy (1985); however, Hall and Liebman note that 
this responsiveness is mainly driven by changes in the value of the stock and stock 
options. 
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3.2 Weakness of past research 
 After spending a fair amount of time researching this topic, I have uncovered 
what I consider to be several errors that may have affected results in past studies. 
First, researchers never properly state the question they are trying to answer. 
While it seems they are trying to determine if a fluctuation in wage has an impact on a 
firm’s performance, they build a wage equation and test for possible determinants. They 
are trying to determine if variations in performance will be followed by an increase or 
decrease in salary. While the results are interesting in assessing which variable might 
define wage, it does not answer what seems to be the underlying question of this problem 
(i.e., “Does an increase in salary, increase or decrease the performance level of a 
company?”) 
 Second, upon building their linear model, several studies have consistently listed 
performance as an exogenous variable. This is somewhat confusing since performance is 
theoretically an endogenous variable, and while the choice of taking a proxy for 
performance is not contested, the lack of any assumptions to support such claims, or the 
indication that any type of endogeneity test were run, is quite surprising due to the quality 
of some papers. Endogeneity in a model signifies inconsistent biased estimator; hence, it 
is probable that most of the results currently found in the literature are erroneous and do 
not correctly answer their question of interest. 
 Finally, Attaway is one of the many who has defined compensation as a short-
term cash incentive.7 Although it is true that the a cash bonus is often defined on a 
performance criteria, the bulk of the incentive comes in the form of long term incentive 
plans; hence, not including this information when accounting for wage will yield weaker 
results that do not correctly define the relationship between CEO salary and firms 
performance.8 While most researchers support their decision based on comparability with 
past studies, it does not justify excluding this information considering they ground their 
paper on agency theory, which proposes incentive scheme as a way to solidify the 
correlation between performance and salary. 
  
                                                 
7 Here are a few other researchers: Murthy and Salter (1975); Veliyath and Bishop (1995); Akhigbe, 
Madura, and Tucker (1995) who have defined remuneration on a short term cash scale. 
8 See section 4.3 for proper definition. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Model 
In light of past empirical research, I intend to hypothesis the following: 
Ho(a): Compensation is not statistically significant 
 Equation (1) describes the model used to test the relationship between 
performance measures and compensation: 
 
 (1)  
utorIndustry
formationofDateBoncompensatiBBePerformanc
k ++
++=
sec_
__)log( 210
δ    
for k=1,2,3,4 
 
Ordinary least square regression will be used to test this model. If I reject the null 
hypothesis, I establish that there is a link between performance and pay.  
An endogeneity problem might occur with respect to compensation. Theoretically 
wage is an endogenous variable; hence, any attempt to regress an endogenous on an 
endogenous will yield erroneous results in the form of bias and inconsistent estimators. 
To correct this problem, I use instrumental variables. Equation (2) describes the model 
used to define the instrumented variable: 
 
(2)  
eSizeBeducationExchangeStocktypeManagement
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      m=1,2,3 , j=1,2 , and k=1,2,3, 4 
 
To chose a proper instrument one needs to follow two properties: The variable 
needs to be uncorrelated with the error of the structural model. This is verified using an 
“Over identifying restriction test”. The second is that the instrumented variables are 
correlated with the instrumental and are all jointly significant. An F statistic is used to test 
if the instrumental variables are jointly significant. The size of the R-square from 
equation (2) will determine whether the instrumentals are weak. The instrumental 
variables were chosen based on their wide usage as determinants in traditional wage 
equations. 9  
                                                 
9 Further detail of each instrumental is given in section 4.3 
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Testing for endogeneity, leads to the following hypothesis: 
Ho(b): Compensation is exogenous 
Equation (3) describes the model used to test for endogeneity once the fitted 
residual values from equation (2) are gathered: 
 
(3)  
uhatresidualtorIndustry
formationofdateBoncompensatiBBePerformanc
k ++
+++=
_sec_
__)log(
1
210
αδ  
         k =1,2,3,4 
 
If we reject the null hypothesis, then compensation is endogenous. If salary is 
endogenous, I proceed to run a two stage least square (2SLS) regression. This leads me 
back to the initial hypothesis: 
Ho(a): Compensation is not statistically significant 
 
Equation (4) describes the form the regression will take when correcting for 
endogeneity: 
 
(4)  
utorIndustry
formationofdateBonCompensatiBBePerformanc
k ++
++=
sec_
__)log( 2
*
10
δ   
         k =1,2,3,4 
 
 I will also be looking at a subgroup of the entire sample to establish if the 
sensitivity level between pay and performance becomes weaker, stronger or remains 
unchanged. In addition, the hypothesis and model specified in section 4.1 will remain 
unchanged. 
 
4.2 Data Source 
 The sample consists of 168 random Canadian firms listed in the Financial Post 
top 500 companies issue. Of the original 342 firms, close to half had to be removed due 
to incomplete proxy information or because historical stock price information was 
unavailable. 10  
                                                 
10 List of all company observed can be found in Appendix B 
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Cross-sectional data was favored over panel data due to data availability11. My 
research director and myself decided that the additional inference gained from panel data 
would have been minimal considering the period observed is after the implosion of the 
stock market, caused by the “dot com” companies and other company scandals such as 
Enron, Worldcom, and Nortel. In addition, Hall and Liebman’s results showed a very 
small difference in coefficients magnitude when favoring time series over cross sectional 
data. 
Information for each of the companies CEO’s selected for the sample was 
gathered from the Financial Post database, publicly available filling with SEDAR (i.e., 
proxy statement, annual report), and direct communication with companies investor 
relation representatives. The industrial makeup of the sample of 168 firms is 28% for 
consumer goods and pharmaceutical industry, 42% for the raw material, industrial 
product, and public service sector, 18% for telecommunication, information technology, 
and media related sector, and 12% for financial and real estate sector. 
Additional information for 2003 was collected: Salary, bonus, restricted stocks, 
phantom stocks, deferred stocks, number of options granted and their exercise price, 
number and identity of outside blockholders, number of members sitting on the board of 
directors, date of formation of the company, size of company, age and tenure of the CEO. 
 
4.3 Chosen Variables 
 Performance measure: I intend to use four-performance measures. Earnings per 
share, return on equity, return on asset, and net profit margin. I chose accounting 
performance measure because they are less affected by unpredictable market 
environment, and it makes them more informative regarding managerial contribution. 
The use of multiple measures of performance is to confirm whether the results obtained 
are robust and remain invariant. 
Earnings per shares (EPS) are probably one of the most popular measures used by 
an investor when looking at investment choice.12 It is a performance measure with a 
                                                 
11 Specific wage labor data is not readily available as it is in the US. Also, there is a requirement that an 
executive must occupy the same position during the period observe, which would have further diminished 
the amount of companies being observed. 
12 EPS: Net Income/ Total number of (o/s) shares. 
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straightforward interpretation since it is the portion of profit allocated to each outstanding 
share of common stock.  
Return on equity (ROE) is equal to the return from investments relative to the 
equity invested.13 It is widely viewed as a measure of a corporation’s profitability. It 
reflects how much the company has earned on the funds invested by the shareholders, 
and it is an important ratio when interpreting a company’s performance.  
Return on Assets (ROA) measures the return to shareholders relative to the total 
assets of the firm.14 It tells you what earnings were generated from invested capital. It is a 
profitability measure, and it indicates how efficient the company is in generating profits 
with the assets it holds.  
 Net-profit margin is an efficiency measure that gives information on how well a 
company manages its cost.15 It is a good way to compare companies in the same 
industries to see which industry is managed proficiently. I chose it because it looks at net 
profit instead of net earnings. 
  
Compensation structure: I use two forms of compensation measure: The first is 
the log of cash compensation taken strictly as salary + bonus + other forms of cash 
payments. The second is the log of total compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonus, 
other type of cash payments, restricted stock units, phantom stock, deferred stock units, 
stock options granted, and stock appreciation right. I did not include data for retirement 
plan or severance pay packages because company proxy information is incomplete. 
The bonus is an annual cash incentive. It is often a lump sum that is paid at the 
end of the current or following fiscal year. The bonus is usually based on performance 
and is often tied to certain performance criteria such as Economic Value Added (EVA). 
Other forms of cash payment are all the type of short-term cash incentives given 
to an executive. They range from car payments, to additional cash remuneration. 
Restricted Stock Units (RSU) is insider holdings that are under some type of sales 
restriction. They are shares given to the CEO, or sold to the CEO at a discounted price. 
                                                 
13 ROE: Net income / Shareholders equity 
14 ROA: Net income / Total Assets 
15 NPM: Net profit/ Net income 
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The restrictions on the stock may imply that the stocks cannot be sold within a certain 
time horizon, or they cannot be sold until certain performance criteria have been met. 
Phantom Stocks is not a physical stock, but a pretend stock. Even though it is not 
real, phantom stock follow the price movement of the company's actual stock, paying any 
resulting dividends.  
Deferred Share Units (DSU) is similar to the restricted shares; however, they 
would typically be exchanged at retirement or upon termination of employment. They are 
awarded to top executives only. Usually, deferred shares vest in full at the end of five 
years, contingent upon the executive remaining in the employment of the issuer over the 
vesting period. 
Stock Appreciation Right (SAR) is similar in concept to phantom stock except 
that it provides a right to collect appreciation on stock for a predetermined number of 
stocks, for a specified period of time.  
European Call Option is an agreement that gives an investor the right (but not the 
obligation) to buy a stock at a specified price within a specific time period. During the 
course of this paper, CEO’s who were awarded American Call Options were excluded.16  
 
Other Exogenous variable:  
Industry sectors are listed as dummy variables with the base group being the 
financial/real estate sector. They take the form: 
D1: 
⎩⎨
⎧
otherwise If  0
 ticalpaharmaceu goods, ypeconsumer tin  dealscompany  If  1
 
D2: 
⎩⎨
⎧
 otherwise If  0
service purblicor  products industrial materials, rawin  dealscompany  If  1
 
D3: ⎩⎨
⎧
otherwise If  0
ententertainmor  media IT, ,in telecom dealscompany  If  1
 
D4: ⎩⎨
⎧
otherwise If  0
estate realor sector  financialin  dealscompany  If  1
 
 
                                                 
16 The choice to exclude this information is based on the nature of the American Option. Since you can 
exercise the option at any time up to the expiration date, it makes it too complex to value. 
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The variable management type is listed as a dummy variable. If the owner, 
individual investors, pension funds, mutual funds, or investment firms hold a minimum 
of 10% of the outstanding shares, then I say, “the company is run by the owner”.17 If the 
company does not appear to have any block stockholders, then I say, “The manager runs 
the company.” The base group is owner run.18 
RUN1: ⎩⎨
⎧
otherwise If  0
ownerby Run  If  1
 
RUN2: ⎩⎨
⎧
otherwise If  0
managerby Run  If  1
  
 
Percentage of outside directors is the percentage of the board of directors who is 
not a top executive, a retired executive, nor a former executive of the company. 
Education was defined as a dummy variable because of the nature of the data.19 The base 
group is educated up to a bachelor degree (Educ1). 
Educ1: ⎩⎨
⎧
otherwise If  0
degreeBachelor  a including and  toupEducation   1
 
Educ2: ⎩⎨
⎧
otherwise 0_If
degreebachelor post  years 3-1 Educated  1
 
Educ3: ⎩⎨
⎧ +
otherwise If  0
degreebachelor post  years 4 Educated  1
 
 
Tenure is the number of years the chief executive officer has maintained his 
current position. I used the logarithm of total revenue (or total sales) as a proxy for size of 
the company, and the date of formation is the date at which the company was first 
incorporated.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Proxy statements indicate principal shareholders for any individual or group that owns 10% of common 
stock.  
18 55% of the companies in the sample seem to be “run by owner”. 
19 Educated 1-3 years post bachelor (ex: CA, CFA, MBA, M.Sc). Educated +4 years post bachelor degree 
(ex: P.hd, double MBA, double M.Sc). Specific information pertaining to time spent to acquire a degree or 
an accreditation is not available to the public.  
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Finally, Stock exchange is listed as a dummy variable. The base group is trading 
on one exchange (SE1). 
SE1: ⎩⎨
⎧
otherwise If 0
exchangeStock  oneon only  Trading  1
 
SE2: ⎩⎨
⎧
otherwise If 0
exchangesStock  moreor  on two Trading  1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18
5 Empirical Results 
 
Sections 5 will be separated in two sub-sections. 5.1 will test the hypothesis stated 
in 4.1 on the sample as a whole and section 5.2 will test the same hypotheses but focusing 
strictly on a subgroup of the sample (i.e., D2: raw material, industrial, and public service 
sector). 
 
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The final sample consists of 168 firms for the year 2003. The mean ROE for 2003 
is 10.18%, the mean ROA is 5.94%, the mean EPS is $1.26, and the mean net profit 
margin is 6.41%. On average the companies are healthy, profitable, and appear to be 
managed efficiently. The mean compensation for the CEO (salary + bonus + other cash 
payment) is $1,237,321, the mean LTIP is $1,073,874, and the mean of total 
compensation is $2,311,195.  
  Table 1  
  Frequency table for the Binary variables (n=168) 
       
    Number  Percent 
Level of Education     
Up to Bachelor 82 49% 
1-3 Year post Bachelor 67 39% 
4 Year post Bachelor 19 12% 
Stock Exchange     
Trading on one 109 65% 
Trading on multiple 59 35% 
Ownership type     
Owner run  101 60% 
Manager Run 67 40% 
Industry Sectors     
D1  48 28% 
D2  70 42% 
D3  30 18% 
D4   20 12% 
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The average total salary is quite substantial and passed the 2 million dollar level, 
yet since the firms display positive profitability measures and have sales ranging in the 
billions, it does not seem excessive. CEO’s in the sample are on average 54 years old, 
with 9.2 years of tenure, and above 50% of them have a post bachelor degree education. 
The firms in the sample are all considered large with average sales above three billion 
dollars annually; they have been incorporated for an average of 33 years. The remaining 
descriptive statistics (min, max, and standard deviations) are disclosed in tables 1 for 
binary variables and table 2 for other control variables. 
   Table 2    
  Summary of selected statistics (n=168)  
          
CEO Variables   Mean  Std Dev Min Max 
            
Salary + Bonus + Other ($000's) 1,237.32 1,132.72 111.8 6,781.21 
LTIP ($000's)  1,073.87 1,747.58 0 11,198.75
Total compensation ($000's) 2,311.20 2,458.41 111.8 12,844.54
Age   53.982 8.525 36 89 
Tenure   9.263 10.18 0 51 
% Outside  73.419 15.822 13.33 100 
Sitting   10.095 3.325 4 20 
Size ($000's)  3,274,064 5,316,311 1,956 29,000,000
Date of Formation  33.601 39.407 1 333 
              
Firm Variables          
EPS   1.258 1.74 -6.21 8.09 
ROE   10.181 14.52 -51.62 61.41 
ROA   5.943 7.366 -33.9 33.79 
NPM     6.418 13.663 -88.73 65.1 
 
  
As can be expected, wide variations exist for some variables. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of total pay including LTIP’s for 2003. It appears that the bulk of salaries are 
concentrated around the hundred thousand dollar point rather than the tens of millions of 
dollars level. This is an interesting observation since public perception assumes the 
opposite. There are similar wide variations for other explanatory variables. 
Unfortunately, these variations only tell us that there are significant differences between 
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the values and do not offer a better interpretation. The information that does single itself 
out is that long-term incentive plans account for 50% of total salary. It seems that 
companies judge the current methods of incentives as acceptable. They are convinced 
that these methods are aligning the objectives of the executive with those of the company. 
 
 
 
Total Compensation ($000’s)
111.8 12844.5
0 
.208092 
 
Figure 1, Distribution of Total Compensation 
 
 
104 firms issued stock options to their Chief Executive Officers as part of their 
LTIP. The average Call option awarded to a CEO has a value of $7.23. Executives are 
awarded a mean of 177,589 units for an average market value of  $1,226,357. These 
options have an average maturity of 8.4 years and a mean annual volatility of 32%.20 The 
maximum value of volatility for a stock was 163%. While it appears very high, it was 
expected since I analyzed a period of 24 months to estimate stock volatility.  
There is a potential problem when valuing an option using Merton’s formula. This 
problem is centered on the constant volatility assumptions used to support his model. 
                                                 
20 252.s=σ   The volatility is equal to the daily standard deviation of the stock times the squared root 
of trading days in a year. 
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Assuming a constant volatility when looking at a period ranging from 4 to 11 years is not 
accurate because a stock will not maintain a set price level or remain stable for an 
indefinite amount of time. While I acknowledge that the options I valued have a potential 
valuation error, Merton’s model is still taken as an industry standard and there is no other 
valid model available at this present time to rectify this problem. The remaining 
descriptive statistics (min, max, and standard deviations) for the other variables used in 
Merton’s model are disclosed in tables 3. 
   Table 3   
  Options summary statistics (n=104) 
      
    Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Market Value 23.220 19.156 0.640 108.783 
Strike Price 23.202 19.180 0.640 108.783 
Maturity   8.385 1.987 4.000 11.000 
Dividend yield 0.022 0.031 0.000 0.203 
Risk free rate 0.045 0.003 0.035 0.053 
Volatility   0.320 0.209 0.137 1.630 
Number of options (000's) 177.589 207.507 10.000 1,320.000
Call option  7.236 6.468 0.021 43.324 
Value of option (000's) 1,226.357 1,756.719 0.997 11,200.000
 
 
Looking at the correlation matrix of compensation and other control variables in 
table 4, I see that the size of the company and executive wage are correlated at close to 
70%, which is high and ties perfectly with Schaefer’s (1998) research that indicate size as 
a strong determinant for CEO’s salary. There is a significant correlation between wage 
and number of directors sitting on board, which corroborates Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker’s (1998) findings of the impact the board composition has on remuneration being 
issued. There is also a positive correlation between a firm’s size and the number of 
directors sitting on the board. While some variables are strongly correlated, there seems 
to be no sign of multicolinearity because none display correlation levels close to unity. 21   
 
 
                                                 
21 Whether a strong linear relationship translates into a ( )jβˆvar  that is too large to be useful, it depends on 
the size of 2σ and jSST  and cannot be defined solely on a high correlation level. 
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    Table 4     
  Correlation Matrix (Compensation, other control variables)  
         
  lsalbon ltotcomp age tenure outside sitting size form 
                  
Lsalbon 1               
ltotcomp 0.8634 1             
Age 0.0414 0.0034 1           
tenure -0.0248 -0.1151 0.4304 1         
outside 0.1863 0.2234 -0.0234 -0.2001 1       
sitting 0.5438 0.535 0.0374 -0.0229 0.1863 1     
size 0.6627 0.7155 -0.0509 -0.089 0.146 0.6354 1   
form 0.2654 0.2218 0.0882 -0.0264 -0.0632 0.3511 0.3028 1
 
 
5.1.2 Results 
Ordinary least square regression was used to test the first hypothesis of the model. 
The results of the regression are displayed in Table 5. I begin by analyzing model (1). 
Cash compensation and total compensation are significant below 1%; therefore, I reject 
the null hypothesis in both cases. There is a positive relationship between pay and 
performance; hence, increases in pay, will increase performance. Since this is a level-log 
model, increasing cash compensation by 1% will increase EPS by only $0.0074. At first 
glance, the coefficient looks small. To get a better estimate of the actual impact on 
performance, I use the data from the sample average company. With a salary at 
$1,237,321 and a firms EPS at $1.258, an increase of 1% on wage will increase net 
earning by 0.6%. In the case of total compensation, the coefficient has diminished by 
close to 30% in size. Increasing total compensation by 1% will increase EPS by $0.0055. 
A 1% increase on the average executive salary yields a 0.4% increase on the average 
company’s net income. This corroborates past researchers findings that there is a positive 
correlation between pay and performance. The impact of pay on performance is not 
marginal as one expects when looking at the size of the coefficient since a 0.4% increase 
on performance is not negligible22. While it does not represent the ideal 1 to 1 ratio (i.e., 
                                                 
22 EPS increases to 1.2654. The average net income of a company is $229,786,570. Wage goes up by 
$12,373 and increase net income by $919,146. While it is true that average earnings are in the hundred of 
millions, you have to keep in mind that this increase is solely guided by salary; hence, the greater the 
percentage increase in salary, the greater the increase in earnings. 
 23
1% increase in wage = 1% increase in performance), it is still a good first indication of 
the efficiency of incentive contracts. 
 
 
   Table 5   
  Cross Sectional Regression  
      
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
    EPS ROE ROA NPM 
Intercept   -8.684 -51.018 -23.699 -44.880 
    (2.266) (20.145) (10.016) (18.608) 
Log cash compensation 0.740 4.414 1.942 3.975 
    (0.162) (1.442) (0.717) (1.332) 
Form   0.004 -0.017 -0.026 -0.038 
    (0.003) (0.030) (0.015) (0.027) 
D1   -0.249 4.387 5.857 -2.888 
    (0.431) (3.833) (1.906) (3.540) 
D2   -0.231 0.510 4.558 0.658 
    (0.413) (3.668) (1.824) (3.388) 
D3   -0.959 -1.139 1.926 -7.548 
    (0.471) (4.184) (2.080) (3.865) 
Observations 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.180 0.069 0.106 0.103 
Intercept   -6.354 -37.260 -16.258 -37.635 
    (1.843) (16.338) (8.141) (14.991) 
Log Total compensation 0.554 3.314 1.360 3.347 
    (0.127) (1.126) (0.561) (1.033) 
Form   0.005 -0.012 -0.024 -0.036 
    (0.003) (0.029) (0.015) (0.027) 
D1   -0.307 4.048 5.670 -3.053 
    (0.432) (3.829) (1.908) (3.513) 
D2   -0.310 0.044 4.337 0.298 
    (0.413) (3.665) (1.826) (3.363) 
D3   -1.005 -1.412 1.788 -7.729 
    (0.472) (4.188) (2.087) (3.843) 
Observations 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.172 0.065 0.098 0.111 
 
When looking at both compensation structures, the variable form is statistically 
significant at 20%. If you increase the date of formation by 1 year, you increase 
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performance by 0.005$.23 The size of the coefficient is indicative of potential economies 
of scale. The industry sectors dummies are all statistically insignificant except for D3. 
Companies in subgroup D3 have, at the base, lower earnings per share.24  
Regardless of the form of remuneration structure, the interpretation will vary if 
one were to look at a very high EPS or a very small one. In the initial case, the effect will 
become marginal whereas in the later the effect will become substantial.25 To get a 
clearer picture on the size of salary variation on performance, I use three other 
performance measures (i.e., ROE, ROA, NPM). With a log-log model, the relationship is 
defined as the elasticity of firm’s performance with respect to a CEO’s compensation. 
 Model (2) uses ROE as the performance measure. Using either cash 
compensation or total compensation, I reject the null hypothesis Ho(a) below 1%. The 
relationship is positive. A 1% increase in cash compensation will raise return on equity 
by 4.44%, which means a company’s net income would also increase by 4.44%. In the 
case of total compensation and holding other factors fixed, a 1% increase on total wage 
will raise ROE by 3.31%, which represents a 3.31% increase on net earnings.26 The 
results appear to be strong enough to dictate the performance a company can expect if it 
were to increase a CEO’s salary. In addition, none of the other exogenous variables used 
in the model appear to be statistically significant. 
 Model (3) replicates the regression using ROA as the performance measure. The 
coefficient for cash and total compensation are positive and significant below 1%; hence, 
I reject the null hypothesis Ho(a) in both cases. When cash compensation increases by 
1%, ROA increases by 1.94%. Holding other factors fixed, this increases a company’s net 
income by 1.94%. When total compensation increases by 1%, ROA increases by 1.36%, 
which again implies a 1.36% increase on net earnings.27 As with ROE, the impacts of 
wage fluctuations are extremely strong and go above a 1 to 1 ratio. This implies that 
regardless of other factors, a salary increase alone can be expected to substantially 
increase a company’s earnings. The variable form is significant at 10%, but it now 
                                                 
23 Looking once more at the samples average company, this represents an increase of 0.4% on net income. 
24 The average company in that subgroup have an EPS that is 0.8% smaller than other sectors (i.e., 1.247 
instead of 1.258).  
25 EPS can be greater if the number of outstanding common shares is small or if the company’s net earning 
is very high. 
26 Assuming a company has net earnings at $300,000,000, this represents a $9,930,000 increase. 
27 Once more assuming the same level of net earnings, this represents an increase of $4,080,000. 
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displays a negative relation with performance. When looking at both remuneration 
structures, adding 1-year to the existence of a company will decrease its ROA by 2%, 
which is counter intuitive. More time spent in an industry should give a company 
additional insight, improve their efficiency level, and not hinder their performance level. 
The industry sector dummies are all statistically significant at low levels, except for 
subgroup D3 who becomes significant at levels of 30% and above. All sectors exhibit a 
positive relation with ROA, and depending on the industry, the performance intercept 
varies between 1 to 5%. 
Finally, Model (4) replicates the regression but with NPM as the performance 
measure. While it is not used traditionally as a performance measure, I found merit in 
using it because it gives a direct estimate on net profits variations. The coefficient for 
cash and total compensation are positive and significant for values below 1%; hence, I 
reject the null hypothesis Ho(a) in either case. When cash compensation increases by 1%, 
NPM increases by 3.98%, which means that a company’s net profit would increase by 
3.98%. In the case of total compensation, holding other factor fixed, a 1% increase in 
wage, will increase NPM by 3.34%, which again indicates a 3.34% increase for a 
company’s net profit.28 As with ROA, the variable form exhibits a negative relation with 
performance and is only statistically significant at 18%. None of the industry sector 
dummies are significant aside from D3, which is significant at 5% for both compensation 
structures. Subgroup D3 net profit margin intercept is lower by 2%. 
 
5.1.3 Endogeneity 
To test the second hypothesis of endogeneity, I start by running a regression with 
robust standard error on equation (2) to verify if the instrumental variables are correlated 
with different forms of wage and if they are jointly significant. Table 6 summarizes the 
results. D1, D2, D3, and Form are the exogenous variables from the structural model, and 
the other variables listed are the instrumental variables.  
Since total compensation holds more interest in the context of my paper, I will 
give a detail analyzes of its determinants. SE2, Run2, and Size are significant at 1%, Edu3 
is significant at 10%, and Sitting is significant at 25%. They all exhibit a positive relation. 
                                                 
28 Assuming a company yields net profit of $50,000,000, this represents a $1,670,000 increase. 
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When Sitting increases by 1%, wage goes up by 0.24%; hence, the impact on salary is 
minimal. When Size increases by 1%, wage goes up by 0.36%. The magnitude is weaker 
than I first anticipated and does not appear to coincide with past American findings 
indicating a strong sensitivity between a company size and executives wage.  
    Table 6 
Regression with Robust Standard Errors 
  Model (5) Model (6) 
  Log(Cash Compensation) Log(Total Compensation)
Intercept 7.380 5.896 
  (0.887) (0.997) 
Form 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
D1 -0.075 0.101 
  (0.169) (0.190) 
D2 -0.078 0.036 
  (0.163) (0.184) 
D3 -0.109 -0.010 
  (0.181) (0.204) 
Age 0.002 0.000 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Tenure 0.009 -0.002 
  (0.012) (0.014) 
Tenure2 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Educ2 0.011 0.106 
  (0.103) (0.116) 
Educ3 0.251 0.318 
  (0.157) (0.177) 
Outside 0.004 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
Sitting 0.036 0.027 
  (0.020) (0.022) 
SE2 0.095 0.379 
  (0.113) (0.127) 
RUN2 0.012 0.288 
  (0.104) (0.117) 
Size 0.264 0.358 
  (0.040) (0.046) 
      
Observations 168 168 
R-square 0.4907 0.5987 
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If the company is trading on more than one stock exchange, the CEO will earn 
46.6% more on his salary.29 
If the executive manages the company, he will earn 33.3% more on his salary. 
The result is surprising, but it is a sign of evident disparity in salary schemes when a CEO 
is free to run the company without anyone of influence (i.e., blockholders or owners) to 
curb some of his power.  
When looking at both models, the first thing that becomes obvious is the strength 
of the instrumental variables. For model (5), I have an R-square of 50%, and I reject the 
null hypothesis of not jointly significant, with an F-Stat of 12.07. For model (6), I obtain 
an R-square of 60%, and I also reject the null hypothesis of not jointly significant with an 
F-stat of 20.39. Both F-statistics are high, and while some of these instrumental variables 
are not individually significant, they are jointly significant. 
With model (5) and (6) exhibiting strong instrumental variables that are jointly 
significant, I proceed to collect the residual for both models and run OLS regressions on 
equation (3). Table 7 summarizes the results. 
Results from Table 7 indicate that for performance as measured by ROE and 
ROA, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that wage, whether it is taken as cash 
compensation or total compensation, is an exogenous variable. Therefore, results 
estimated by OLS are robust and hold. On the other hand, using both forms of 
compensation, the results for EPS and NPM show a t-statistics that is significant for 
residual; consequently, I reject the null hypothesis Ho(b) of wage being exogenous. 
In the case of EPS, the residual is significant at 10% for both salary structures. For 
NPM, the variable is only significant for total compensation at 7%. With the presence of 
an endogenous, the results estimated by OLS for EPS and NPM become biased and 
inconsistent. I proceed to run a two stage least square on equation (4). 
The coefficients estimated are the same as the ones listed in Table 7. The only 
thing that changes is the R-square, but it is inconsequential when estimated by 2SLS 
because it has no natural interpretation. 
The first thing that becomes obvious is the size of the coefficients. Cash 
compensation and total compensation are significant at less than 1%. A 1% increase in 
                                                 
29 To measure the change in y: [ ]1)exp(.100% −=∆ jy β  
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cash compensation increases EPS by 0.012$. The size of the coefficient increased and is 
now indicative of a 0.9% increase of the average company net earnings.  
  Table 7 
  OLS Regression with residuals  
  Model (7) Model (8) Model (9)
Model 
(10)  
    EPS ROE ROA NPM 
Intercept  -14.815 -52.792 -22.207 -30.683 
   (3.331) (30.172) (15.000) (27.829) 
Log cash compensation 1.186 4.543 1.833 2.943 
   (0.240) (2.178) (1.083) (2.008) 
Form  0.002 -0.017 -0.026 -0.033 
   (0.003) (0.031) (0.015) (0.028) 
D1  -0.086 4.434 5.817 -3.265 
   (0.430) (3.890) (1.934) (3.588) 
D2  -0.129 0.540 4.533 0.421 
   (0.408) (3.698) (1.839) (3.411) 
D3  -0.871 -1.114 1.904 -7.751 
   (0.465) (4.209) (2.093) (3.883) 
Residual  -0.797 -0.231 0.194 1.846 
   (0.322) (2.913) (1.448) (2.686) 
Observations 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.2102 0.069 0.1058 0.1055 
Intercept  -8.968 -28.345 -10.437 -14.550 
   (2.401) (21.441) (10.674) (19.496) 
Log Total compensation 0.739 2.685 0.949 1.719 
   (0.167) (1.492) (0.743) (1.356) 
Form  0.004 -0.009 -0.022 -0.027 
   (0.003) (0.030) (0.015) (0.027) 
D1  -0.236 3.806 5.512 -3.679 
   (0.432) (3.854) (1.919) (3.504) 
D2  -0.279 -0.060 4.269 0.029 
   (0.412) (3.675) (1.830) (3.342) 
D3  -0.972 -1.524 1.715 -8.020 
   (0.470) (4.200) (2.091) (3.818) 
Residual  -0.430 1.467 0.958 3.798 
   (0.255) (2.279) (1.134) (2.072) 
Observations 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.1863 0.0675 0.1019 0.1293 
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In the case of total compensation, a 1% increase yields a 0.0074$ increase in 
earning per share, which represents a 0.6% increase on the mean company’s net 
income.30 Finally, with NPM, the coefficient is significant only at 20%. A 1% increase in 
total salary will increase performance by 1.72%, which represents a similar percentage 
increase for a company’s net profit. The coefficient is now smaller, yet it is still a fair 
indication of the strength that ties wage fluctuation to a company’s performance. 
With the use of multiple instrumental variables, I use an overidentifying 
restriction test to check for the presence of endogenous variables in the reduced model. 31 
The results are summarized in table 8.   
   Table 8  
  
Overidentifying restriction tests 
 
    EPS NPM Critical Value
Log(Cash Compensation) 13.60 n/a 22.36 
Log(Total compensation) 18.04 11.96 22.36 
 
Whether I take EPS or NPM, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that all 
instrumental variables are exogenous against the 5% critical value of ( )213X . 
 
5.1.4 Heteroskedasticity 
In order to conclude, I still need to check for forms of heteroskedasticity. To test 
for heteroskedasticity, I will first look at figures 2-9, which are plots of fitted values 
against their residual that can be found in Appendix C. If I take wide enough boundaries, 
the plot of each figure seems to exhibit a constant variance. Since it is hard to define if a 
variance is constant just by looking at a plot graph, I run a Breusch Pagan test to confirm 
that all the models are in fact homoskedastic. Table 9 summarizes the results of the test 
for both compensation structures.  
Regardless of the compensation structure or the form of performance used, I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.  
 
                                                 
30 With mean net income at $229,786,570, this represents a $1,378,719 increase. 
31 21nROT = ~ ( )213X . Where the R-square is obtained from regressing the residual, gathered in the 2SLS 
equation, against all the exogenous variables. 
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   Table 9 
 Breusch Pagan Heteroskedasticity Test 
  Log (Cash Compensation) Log (Total Compensation) 
EPS 5.880** 6.703** 
ROE 8.198 8.803 
ROA  6.653 6.367 
NPM 6.350 26.074** 
Note: The (**) is for results applied against a 1%, ( )214X = 29.14. All other  
results are tested against a 1%, ( )25X = 15.09 
 
This concludes section 5.1 and partially corroborates past studies results in that 
the relationship between performance and salary is positive and statistically significant. 
The results divert from other studies in terms of the size of the coefficient representing 
the sensitivity level of the relationship. While most researchers have found very low 
sensitivity levels, I find a wage coefficient that has a strong impact on performance. 
Depending on the performance measure used, it will vary in size; nevertheless, it remains 
strong and is a good indication of the benefits obtained through incentive contracts. 
Switching from cash compensation to total compensation reduces the size of the 
coefficient and lowers the impact of the variation, which reinforces the initial statement 
made in section 3.2 concerning the drawbacks of excluding equity compensation when 
accounting for wage (i.e., results found in the past might have been overestimated). 
Models used and the period being observed explain the difference with past research. 
With several scandals involving CEO’s made public in recent years, company’s have 
been more transparent with their financial statement accuracy and board of directors have 
been more reasonable with pay packages offered to chief executives. Finally, the 
difference in compensation structure barely affected the coefficients for industry sectors 
and the date of formation. In all cases, the variables were not consistently significant; 
hence, they should not always be included in the regressions.  
In an attempt to determine if a specific industry exhibits a different level of 
sensitivity, I focus on subgroup D2 in the following section.  
 
 
 
 31
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics on subgroup D2 
The industry group D2 consists of 70 companies in the raw material, industrial 
product and public service sectors. Looking at the mean: ROE dropped by 0.76%, ROA 
increased by 0.72%, EPS increased by $0.07, and NPM increased by 2.59%. The average 
cash compensation decreased by $39,240, yet the LTIP increased by $89,662, which 
means that total salary increased by $50,422. 
 
  Table 10  
  Frequency table for the Binary variables (n=70)
    
    Number  Percent 
Level of Education     
Up to Bachelor 30 43% 
1-3 Year post Bachelor 32 46% 
4 Year post Bachelor 8 11% 
Stock Exchange     
Trading on one 43 61% 
Trading on multiple 27 39% 
Ownership type     
Owner run   40 57% 
Manager Run 30 43% 
 
The age, tenure and education level remains unchanged. While the firms are still 
quite large, the average annual sales dropped to 2 ½ billion dollars annually. The 
remaining descriptive statistics (min, max, and standard deviations) are disclosed in 
tables 10 for binary variables and table 11 for the other exogenous variables. 
Figure 18 shows the distribution of total pay for group D2. The bulk of salaries 
are now concentrated closer to the two hundred thousand dollar point. Total salaries in 
this subgroup are greater and more spread out. As per with all industry sectors, long term 
incentive plans still account for 50% of total pay. In addition, while average sales 
(indicating size) are 850 million dollars smaller, the CEO earns on average $50,000 more 
annually. This could be due to the subgroup D2 valuing education at a higher level. 
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   Table 11    
  Summary of selected statistics (n=70)  
       
CEO Variables   Mean  Std Dev Min Max 
            
Salary + Bonus + Other ($000's) 1,198.081 1,038.577 145.530 5,550.000 
LTIP ($000's)  1,163.536 1,956.099 0.000 11,198.750 
Total compensation ($000's) 2,361.617 2,515.154 181.130 12,844.540 
Age   53.97143 8.316165 36 85 
Tenure   9.014286 11.28099 0 51 
% Outside  75.52529 15.64673 28.57 100 
Sitting   9.371429 2.751397 5 17 
Size ($000's)  2,440,680 3,176,750 24,653 17,900,000 
Date of Formation  29.3 26.00967 4 123 
          
Firm Variables      
EPS   1.335143 1.853307 -1.57 8.09 
ROE   9.422714 14.4492 -51.62 52.91 
ROA   6.664571 7.113448 -2.85 33.79 
NPM     9.069143 14.8791 -17.8 65.1 
 
 
Total Cash Compensation (000’s)
181.13 12,844.5
0 
.257143 
   Figure 10, Distribution of Total compensation 
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68% of companies have awarded stock options to their CEO’s. The average Call 
option awarded to a CEO has a value of $7.57. The Mean options decreased to 166,460 
units for an average market value of  $1,244,836. These options have an average maturity 
of 8.4 years and a mean annual volatility of 29.6%. The maximum value of volatility for 
a stock went down from 163% to 68%. This is not surprising because this subgroup 
represents company less variant to outside factors. The remaining descriptive statistics 
(min, max, and standard deviations) for the other variables used in Merton’s model are 
disclosed in tables 12. 
 
   Table 12  
  Options Summary statistics (n=48) 
      
    Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Market Value 24.371 19.568 1.800 108.783
Strike Price 24.262 19.549 1.800 108.783
Maturity   8.396 2.151 5.000 11.000
Dividend yield 0.026 0.032 0.000 0.131
Risk free rate 0.046 0.004 0.038 0.053
Volatility   0.298 0.128 0.147 0.682
Number of options (000's) 166.460 206.774 4.000 1,000.000
Call option  7.574 7.515 0.000 43.324
Value of option (000's) 1,244.836 2,075.494 16.150 11,200.000
 
 
Looking at the correlation matrix of compensation and other control variables in 
table 13, the size of the company and executive wage are still correlated at a high level. 
The correlation between salary and percentage of directors sitting on the board dropped 
by 20%; hence, subgroup D2 salary scale is influenced less by the boards composition. 
While some variables are still strongly correlated, there is no sign of multicolinearity.  
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    Table 13    
  Correlation Matrix (Compensation, other control variables)  
         
  lsalbon ltotcomp age tenure outside sitting size form 
                  
Lsalbon 1               
Ltotcomp 0.8438 1             
Age 0.053 0.0096 1           
Tenure 0.0098 -0.0941 0.5739 1         
outside 0.2084 0.2738 0.076 -0.1859 1       
sitting 0.3641 0.3932 0.1373 -0.002 0.3251 1     
Size 0.5943 0.6525 0.1409 -0.1769 0.2396 0.5844 1   
Form 0.1447 0.1477 0.2999 0.0585 -0.0561 0.2485 0.2756 1
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5.2.2 Results on subgroup D2 
 Once more, ordinary least square regression was used to test Ho(a). The results of 
the regression are displayed in Table 14. 
 
   Table 14  
  Cross Sectional Regression on D2 
      
  Model (11) Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) 
    EPS ROE ROA NPM 
Intercept  -7.668 -30.932 -11.633 -28.344 
   (3.741) (29.959) (14.564) (30.186) 
Log cash compensation 0.659 3.028 1.448 3.021 
   (0.275) (2.201) (1.070) (2.218) 
Form  0.000 -0.037 -0.052 -0.135 
   (0.008) (0.068) (0.033) (0.068) 
Observations 70 70 70 70 
R-squared 0.080 0.029 0.053 0.071 
Intercept  -5.350 -30.353 -11.404 -30.108 
   (3.072) (24.264) (11.797) (24.391) 
Log Total compensation 0.472 2.888 1.384 3.049 
   (0.218) (1.722) (0.837) (1.731) 
Form  0.000 -0.040 -0.053 -0.139 
   (0.009) (0.067) (0.033) (0.068) 
Observations 70 70 70 70 
R-squared 0.067 0.042 0.066 0.087 
 
I begin by analyzing model (11). Cash compensation and total compensation are 
both significant at 5% with a positive relationship between pay and performance. The 
coefficients are now smaller and become significant at a higher level. In the case of cash 
compensation, an increase of 1% in wage will increase EPS by 0.0065$. This represents 
an increase of 0.4% for the subgroups average company’s net earnings. As for total 
compensation, an increase of 1% in salary will increase EPS by 0.0047$, which is a 0.3% 
increase on the average company’s net income.32 In both cases, I reject the null Ho(a), 
and find that there is a correlation between compensation and performance. The 
sensitivity level dropped for both compensation structure when compared to the sample 
as a whole, but the coefficient is strong enough not to be considered marginal. The 
                                                 
32 The mean company net income is $228,321,060. A 0.3% increase represents a hike of $684,963 in net 
earnings. 
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variable form, when looking at both compensation structures, is statistically insignificant 
and exhibits very high p-values.  
Model (12) replicates the regression but with ROE as the performance measure. 
Using first cash compensation, I reject the null Ho(a) at 20%. A 1% increase in cash 
compensation increases ROE by 3.02%, which yields a 3.02% increase on a company’s 
net income. Using total compensation, I reject the null at 10%. When total compensation 
increases by 1%, ROE increases by 2.88%; hence, a firm’s net earnings would also 
increase by 2.88%.33 As per with the previous section, the elasticity model displays 
clearer and stronger effects of wage fluctuation on performance. The sensitivity levels 
dropped for both types of compensation structure. In the case of cash compensation they 
dropped by close to 1% and by 0.5% for total compensation. While it appears that the 
CEO’s from this subgroup are not as responsive to wage increases, one should not forget 
that the company’s forming this subgroup might be limited by the growth potential of 
their industry. As an example, a CEO in the financial sector might be able to develop 
certain strategies that would permit capital growth more so than a CEO in the raw 
material sector. In addition, the variable form is not statistically significant. 
 Model (13) replicates the regression but with ROA as the performance measure. 
The coefficient for cash compensation and total compensation is positive and significant 
at 20% and 10% for the later; hence, I reject the null Ho(a) in both case. When cash 
compensation increases by 1%, ROA increases by 1.44%, which represents a similar 
percentage increase in net income. When total compensation increases by 1%, ROA 
increases by 1.38%, which represents a 1.38% increase in net earnings.34 As per with the 
other performance measures, the coefficients dropped in size. The variable form is 
significant at 10%. If you look at both remuneration structures, increasing the date of 
formation by 1 year will decrease ROA by 5% (i.e., net earnings drop by 5%). Compared 
to the sample as a whole, the size of the coefficient increased by 3% and the relationship 
is now negative. D2 is a subgroup composed of sectors that should be flourishing when 
the resources deplete due to an increase in demand; hence, a drop in performance when 
                                                 
33 Assuming a company has net earnings of $300,000,000, this represents a $8,640,000 increase. 
34 Assuming a company has net earnings of $300,000,000, this represents a $4,140,000 increase. 
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an industry has been in the market for a longer period does not have a straightforward 
interpretation.  
Finally, Model (14) replicates the regression but with NPM as the performance 
measure. The coefficient for cash compensation and total compensation are positive and 
significant at 20% and 10% for the later; therefore, I reject the null hypothesis Ho(a) in 
both cases. When cash compensation increases by 1%, NPM increases by 3.02%, which 
represents a 3.02% increase for a company’s net profit. When total compensation 
increases by 1%, NPM increases by 3.04%, which yields a similar percentage increase for 
a firm’s net profit.35 The variable form is now statistically significant at 5%. When 
looking at both payment structures, increasing the date of formation by 1 year will 
decrease NPM by 13%, which is substantial and counterintuitive.  
The results are consistent with the ones obtained in section 5.1. While there is a 
positive statistical relationship connecting pay to performance, the magnitude of the 
relationship is now smaller. The difference in sensitivity varies between 0.1 to 1% 
depending on the type of remuneration and performance measure being used. As per with 
the previous section, the sensitivity is smaller when using total compensation. In addition, 
the R-square went done for all performance measures in this subgroup, but this could be 
due to a smaller degree of freedom and a smaller sample size. 
 
5.2.3 Endogeneity 
I run a regression with robust standard error on equation (2) to test if the 
instrumental variables are still strong and jointly significant. Table 15 summarizes the 
results.  
As per section 5.1, I only analyze data for total compensation since it holds more 
relevance in the context of my research. When looking at subgroup D2, larger amounts of 
variable are individually statistically significant. The coefficient for age is negative and 
significant at 15%. A 1-year increase in the CEO’s age will decrease his total pay by 2%. 
On the other hand, a 1-year increase in tenure will increase CEO salary by 2%. The 
dummy variables for education are significant at 15%. If the CEO has an education level 
that is either at Educ2 or Educ3 level, his wage will be greater by either 30% or 53% for 
                                                 
35 Assuming a company has net profits of $50,000,000, this represents an increase of  $1,520,000. 
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the later, which supports the earlier made statements on the subgroup valuing education 
at a higher level. If the company is trading on more than one stock exchange, the CEO’s 
earn 52% more on his wage. If the CEO runs the company, his salary is 39% higher.  
Table 15 
Regression with Robust Standard Errors 
  Model (15) Model (16) 
  Log(Cash Compensation) Log(Total Compensation)
Intercept 6.309 5.819 
  (1.576) (1.809) 
Form 0.001 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Age -0.017 -0.024 
  (0.015) (0.016) 
Tenure 0.025 0.024 
  (0.020) (0.025) 
Tenure2 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Educ2 0.175 0.269 
  (0.176) (0.192) 
Educ3 0.536 0.428 
  (0.259) (0.297) 
Outside 0.003 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
Sitting -0.008 -0.018 
  (0.040) (0.051) 
SE2 0.071 0.421 
  (0.197) (0.269) 
RUN2 0.113 0.327 
  (0.163) (0.196) 
Size 0.370 0.423 
  (0.085) (0.095) 
Observations 70.000 70.000 
R-square 0.451 0.564 
 
Finally, the size of the company is still positive and statistically significant at 
below 1%. A 1% increase in size will increase total wage by 0.42%, which is a marginal 
increase. 
The instrumental variables for both models (15) and (16) are still very strong with 
R-squares at 45% and 56%. I reject the null hypothesis of not jointly significant for both 
compensation structures. Model (15) has an f-statistic of 4.54 and model (16) has an f-
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statistic of 7.20. While both f-statistics are significant, they are low compared to ones 
estimated in section 5.1.3.  
I proceed to collect the residuals for both models and run OLS regressions on 
equation (3). Table 16 summarizes the results. 
Table 16 
  OLS Regression with residuals on D2 
 
  Model (7) Model (8) Model (9)
Model 
(10)  
    EPS ROE ROA NPM 
Intercept  -12.071 -48.345 -24.736 -23.917 
   (5.630) (45.372) (21.995) (45.802) 
Log cash compensation 0.983 4.312 2.414 2.695 
   (0.415) (3.341) (1.620) (3.373) 
Form  -0.002 -0.043 -0.056 -0.133 
   (0.009) (0.069) (0.033) (0.070) 
Residual  -0.579 -2.289 -1.723 0.582 
   (0.553) (4.460) (2.162) (4.503) 
Observations 70.000 70.000 70.000 70.000 
R-squared 0.095 0.033 0.063 0.071 
Intercept  -8.689 -37.784 -15.960 -13.022 
   (4.102) (32.737) (15.908) (32.786) 
Log Total compensation 0.710 3.418 1.709 1.830 
   (0.292) (2.329) (1.132) (2.332) 
Form  -0.002 -0.043 -0.055 -0.132 
   (0.009) (0.068) (0.033) (0.068) 
Residual  -0.534 -1.189 -0.729 2.733 
   (0.437) (3.486) (1.694) (3.491) 
Observations 70.000 70.000 70.000 70.000 
R-squared 0.087 0.044 0.068 0.096 
 
Results from Table 16 are different than ones in table 7. With performance 
measured by ROE, ROA or NPM, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that salary, 
regardless of the remuneration type, is an exogenous variable. Therefore, results 
estimated by OLS are robust and consistent. For EPS, the null hypothesis of exogenous 
can only be rejected at high levels (i.e., 30% for cash compensation and 25% for total 
compensation).  
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While the wage appears to be exogenous with all performance measures, I will 
assume endogeneity in the case of EPS, and proceed to run a two stage least square on 
equation (4). Table 16 summarizes the results. 36  
The first thing that becomes obvious is the size of the coefficients increased. Both 
compensation structures are positive and significant at 5%. A 1% increase in cash 
compensation now increases EPS by 0.0098$, which represents an increase of 0.7% on 
the average company’s net income. In the case of total compensation, a 1% increase 
yields a 0.0071$ increase in earnings per share, which represents a 0.5% increase on the 
average firms net earnings.37 The impact of both coefficients on performance increased. 
In addition, the variable form is now statistically insignificant at very high levels. 
I use an overidentifying restriction test to check for the presence of endogenous 
instrumental variables. 38 The results are summarized in table 17. 
 
  Table 17   
Overidentifying Restriction Test  
    EPS Critical Value 
Log(Cash Compensation) 11.96 18.31 
Log(Total compensation) 11.47 18.31 
 
Regardless of the compensation structure, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
all instrumental variables are exogenous against the 5% critical value of ( )210X . 
5.2.4 Heteroskedasticity  
Before concluding this section, I still need to test for possible forms of 
heteroskedasticity. I first look at figure 11-18, which can be found in Appendix D. The 
graph for EPS fitted values against residuals, seems to exhibit an increasing variance for 
both types of compensation structures. The graph for ROE, ROA and NPM is a bit more 
erratic with the residuals being fairly dispersed. If I take wide boundaries, I can assume 
                                                 
 
36 As indicated earlier, the coefficient estimated are the same as the ones listed in Table 16. 
 
37 With a mean net income at $228,321,060, this represents a $1,141,605. 
38 21nROT = ~ ( )210X . Where the R-square is obtained from regressing the residual, gathered in the 2SLS 
equation, against all the exogenous variables. 
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the variance is constant. To confirm the homoskedasticity of all models, I run a Breusch 
Pagan test. Table 18 summarizes the results. 
 
   Table 18 
 Breusch Pagan Heteroskedasticity Test 
  Log (Cash Compensation) Log (Total Compensation) 
EPS 6.734** 7.518** 
ROE 2.716 2.653 
ROA  2.331 2.702 
NPM 2.121 2.114 
 
Note: The (**) is for results applied against a 1%, ( )211X = 24.72. All other  
results are tested against a 1%, ( )22X = 9.21 
 
Regardless of the compensation structure or the form of performance used as an 
endogenous, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.  
Results from this section indicate that for subgroup D2 there is a loss of 
sensitivity between pay and performance. While the size is greater with some of the 
endogenous variables, it is not significant enough to indicate that this subgroup is less 
responsive to incentive contract. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary 
 This study provides empirical evidence that there is a positive correlation between 
performance and CEO compensation for Canadian publicly traded companies. The 
evidence is consistent with studies done in the United States, yet it separates itself in 
terms of the strength of the sensitivity level that defines this relationship. While most 
researchers have agreed that there is a positive relationship connecting a chief executive’s 
salary to a firm’s performance, their results always yielded weak sensitivity levels 
indicative of marginal response when varying salary to improve a company’s 
performance. This severely questioned the efficiency of incentive contracts and further 
emphasized the possible disparity of the situation.  
In this paper, performance as measured by earning per share is positively 
correlated to short and long term monetary remuneration. It is statistically significant 
below 1%, and for every 1% increase on a chief executive total compensation, it 
represents a 0.6% increase on the average company’s net earning. The use of other 
performance measures such as ROE, ROA and NPM yielded similar relationships, but 
with coefficients indicating a stronger impact of wage variation on net earnings or net 
profits. In the case of ROE and ROA, the variation of a company’s net income went as 
high as 4% for every 1% increase on total CEO’s remuneration. This effect is by far 
superior than the common shareholder would have anticipated and ties perfectly with the 
period being observed. This is not a period of bullish market anymore, and with 
shareholder confidence being eroded steadily every time a new company scandal 
surfaces, firm’s necessity for transparency has made incentive contracts as efficient as 
possible.  
In an attempt to test whether this relationship might be different when focusing on 
a specific industry sector, I ran similar tests on a subgroup of the sample. The subgroup 
was composed of three major sectors: raw material, industrial product, and public service 
industry. The relationship between performance and compensation remained positive. 
The coefficients became significant at higher levels, and their size dropped by close to 
1%. The sensitivity levels are far from being negligible but indicate a lower performance 
response when increases in salary occur. This shows that companies from these specific 
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industry sectors might not be able to increase their performance as easily even if the CEO 
leading them is working in the best interest of the firm.  
This study also pointed out that when excluding long-term incentive plans from 
the remuneration structure of a CEO, all results become overstated. This held true 
whether I focused on the sample as a whole or just a subgroup of its sectors. The 
hypothesis of possible endogeniety of wage was confirmed when tested against earning 
per share and net profit margin. With the endogeneity of pay, came the use of 
instrumental variables. The choice of instrumental variables (i.e., age, tenure, tenure-
square, board composition, ownership type, stock exchange, and size of company) was 
guided by past research on CEO determinants. The instrumental variables used were 
strong with R-squares ranging between 50 to 60% and were jointly significant with 
strong f-statistics. The coefficients estimated by 2SLS were positive, statistically 
significant at 5%, and were greater in size than the ones estimated by OLS. When 
focusing on the subgroup, the hypothesis of endogeneity of wage surfaced in the model 
with EPS but only at 30% level. As per results from the total sample, the relationship kept 
the same properties found in the total sample. 
This study has taken a different approach to past studies by analyzing the problem 
as an effect of wage fluctuation on performance. The results were robust regardless of 
compensation structure or performance measures. The sensitivity tying pay to 
performance remained strong. An attempt to test whether a subgroup of industry would 
change the type of relationship, proved accurate. The subgroup encompassing raw 
material, industrial product, and public service sector, displayed a lower sensitivity level 
between salary and performance regardless of the payment structure.  
The parallel between chief executive officers remuneration between Canada and 
the US is not shocking given the economic tie that has developed between Canada and 
the United States. What becomes clear in this research is that labour contracts attempting 
to link pay to performance are efficient and appear to be successful in resolving the 
agency problem. It is my belief that the disparity of sensitivity found between my 
research and past research are not strictly due to my model but to the period being 
observed. These findings shed new light on this question and should motivate any future 
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research to focus on the period at hand instead of looking at 10 year-old data to define the 
pay performance relationship. 
 
6.2 Suggestion for future research 
While the conclusions of this paper are robust, here are suggestions for future 
research in the area of firm’s performance and chief executive officer compensation. 
If one were to have access to greater resources, a larger sample size could be 
gathered and the use of panel data can be considered. The use of panel data can give the 
researcher greater options when defining performance measures. Murphy’s use of a 
variation in shareholder wealth has merits and should be considered. When performance 
is measured in different ways, more robust results can be obtained and clearer 
interpretation of results can be given. With a larger sample size, a distinction could be 
placed between smaller and larger firms to see if the sensitivity levels are affected 
differently. A larger sample size, may also give the opportunity to focus solely on a 
single sector and test for changes in sensitivity levels. 
In this study Merton’s modified Black Scholes formula is used to value the option 
portion of the LTIP. When looking at long periods of maturity, assuming constant 
volatility is not precise. If a model were to account for fluctuating volatility over the 
maturity period of the option, a more accurate valuation of options could be rendered. 
These new values may modify the relationship tying pay to performance since they form 
the nucleus of incentive contracts. 
Finally, if one were to have greater access to companies accounting information, 
it would be interesting to further delve into the firms consolidated statement of earnings. 
While I have used different performance measures to clarify the interpretation of the 
sensitivity levels, it would be interesting to see what portion of operating expenses a CEO 
salary represents. This could give further insight on the size of the impact caused by a 
CEO’s salary increase and therefore give a better idea of the resulting proportional size of 
the variation in the earning portion. 
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Appendix A: Option Valuation 
 
Black-Scholes (1973) model 
 
 
 
The first part, SN(d1), derives the expected benefit from acquiring a stock 
outright. The second part of the model, Ke(-rt)N(d2), gives the present value of paying 
the exercise price on the expiration day. The market value of the call option is then 
calculated by taking the difference between these two parts. (Rubash, Kuvin. Bradley 
University) 
 
Merton’s modified Black-Scholes (1973)  
 
C = ( )TZXeZSe rTdT σφφ −− −− )(  
 
Where: 
C =  Price of option 
S=  Common stock price on the date of grant (data source: proxy statement) 
X=  Strike price (data source: proxy statement) 
φ (.) =  Cumulative standard normal distribution function 
T=  time to expiration (data source: proxy statement) 
r =  continuous risk-free interest rate, measure as ln(1+R), where R is the annual 2, 5, 
10 and average market yield (data source: Bank of Canada) 
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d= continuous dividend yield defined as ln [1 + (dividend per share/closing stock 
price)] (data source: Financial post database) 
σ = estimated monthly stock return variance for a period of 24 months. (data source: 
Yahoo finance historical stock price) 
Z= ( ) ( )[ ] ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛+−+ TTdrXS σσ 2/ln 2  
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Appendix B: Sample Firms 
George Weston limited   Loblaw Companies limited 
Royal Bank of Canada   Sun Life Financial Inc. 
BCE Inc.     Imperial Oil Limited 
Canadian Imperial bank of commerce Manulife Financial Corporation 
Power Corporation Canada   Toronto Dominion Bank 
Encana Corporation    Nortel Networks Corporation 
Bank of Montreal    Petro-Canada 
Quebecor Inc.     Thomson  
Sobeys inc.     Shell Canada Limited 
Hudson's Bay Company   Telus Corp. 
Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited  Noranda Inc. 
Suncor Energy inc.    Canadian national Railway Company 
Nova Chemicals Corp    Transcanada Corporation 
Abitibi-Consilidated Inc.   Talisman energy inc. 
Enbridge inc.     Rogers Communication inc. 
Domtar inc.     National Bank of Canada 
Cp Ships Limited    Canadien Pacfic Railway Limited 
Inco Limited     Dofasco inc. 
Cascades Inc.     Nexen inc. 
Agrium Inc.     Saputo Inc. 
Industrial Alliance Insurance  
and Financial Services inc.   SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. 
Tembec inc.     Falconbridge Limited 
Barrick Gold Corporation   Agricore United  
CGI Group Inc.    Rona Inc. 
Placer Dome  Inc.    TransAlta Corporation 
Masonite International   Aliant Inc. 
Ati Technologies Inc.    Methanex Corporation 
Cott Corporation    Precision Drilling Corporation 
IPSCO Inc.     MDS inc. 
Intrawest Corporation    West Fraser Timber C. ltd. 
Linamar Corporation    Russel Metals Inc. 
Penn West Petroleum Limited  Toromont Industries limited 
Emera Inc.     Algoma Steel Inc. 
Laurentian Bank of Canada   Biovail Corporation 
Cinram International inc.   CAE Inc. 
Candian Oil sands trust   Fording Canadian Coal Trust 
Forzani Group Ltd.    Reitmans (Canada) Limited 
Creo  Inc.     Fortis inc. 
Canam Group Inc.    Kinross Gold Corporation 
Manitoba Telecom Services Inc.  FPI limited 
Transforce income fund   Arc energy trust units 
Cossette communication Group Inc.  Ridley Inc. 
Flint energy services limited   Hartco Corporation 
Geac Computer Corporation Limited  Cogeco Inc. 
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Patheon Inc.     ATS automation tooling system Inc. 
Rothmans inc.     Parkland Income Fund 
Softchoice Corp.    RioCan Real estate investment Trust 
Astral Media Inc.    Leon's Furniture Limited 
Bonavista Energy trust   Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. 
Stantec Inc.     Vincor International Inc. 
TimberWest forest Corp.   Hub international Ltd. 
Goldcorp Inc.     Morguard Corporation 
Hip Interactive Corp.    Van Houtte Inc. 
Western Oil Sands Inc.   High Liner Foods Incorporated 
Vermilion energy trust   Mega Bloks  
Aur Resources Inc.    O&Y Properties Corporation 
Contrans Income Fund   KCP Income Fund  
Trican Well Service Limited   Sico Inc. 
Algoma Central Corporation   St. Lawrence Cement Group Inc. 
Cambior inc.     Shermag Inc. 
IPL inc.      HumptyDumpty Snack Foods 
SportScene Restaurants Inc.   Dalsa Corporation 
NexxLink Technologies Inc.   EXFO  electro-opt engine Inc. 
Nurun Inc.     Agnico-Eagle Mines Inc. 
Axcan Pharma Inc.    Celestica inc. 
Maple Leaf foods inc.    Canada Bread company, limited 
Magellan Aerospace Corporation  Heating oil partner and fund 
Mullen Transportation   Spectra Premium industry inc. 
SR Telecom inc.    Aeterna Zentaris inc. 
Empire Company limited   Metro inc. 
Shaw Communication Inc.   Finning International Inc. 
Ensign Resources services   CFM corporation 
Samuel Manu-Tech Inc.   Acetex  
Baytex Energy trust    Dundee Precious Metals 
Strongco Inc.     Atlas Cold storage Income trust 
Velan Inc.     Inmet Mining Corporation 
Potash Corporation of Sakatchewan  Dorel Industries inc. 
Trizec Canada     Aecon 
Nav Energy Trust    Research in Motion 
Campbell Resources inc.   Goodfellow Inc. 
Harris Steel     Winpak 
Vitran      Optimum 
TVA Group     La Senza 
Gendis      SunOpta 
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Appendix C:  HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
EPS –[Log (Cash Compensation)] 
Figure 2, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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EPS –[Log (Total Compensation)] 
Figure 3, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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ROE –[Log (Cash Compensation)] 
Figure 4, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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ROE –[Log (Total Compensation)] 
Figure 5, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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ROA –[Log (Cash Compensation)] 
Figure 6, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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ROA –[Log (Total Compensation)] 
Figure 7, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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NPM –[Log (Cash Compensation)] 
Figure 8, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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NPM –[Log (Total Compensation)] 
Figure 9, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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Appendix D:  HETEROSKEDASTICITY on D2 
EPS –[Log (Cash Compensation)] 
Figure 11, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
F
it
te
d
 v
a
lu
e
s
Residuals
-3.36119 7.55957
-.408875
3.13769
 
EPS –[Log (Total Compensation)] 
Figure 12, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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ROE –[Log (Cash Compensation)] 
Figure 13, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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ROE –[Log (Total Compensation)] 
Figure 14, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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ROA –[Log (Cash Compensation)] 
Figure 15, Graph of fitted values against residuals  
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ROA –[Log (Total Compensation)] 
Figure 16, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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NPM –[Log (Cash Compensation)] 
Figure 17, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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NPM –[Log (Total Compensation)] 
Figure 18, Graph of fitted values against residuals 
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